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Introduction
In many states, teacher shortages have led to greater opportunities for teachers to join the
workforce without an in-state teaching education. Before the teaching shortage, most teachers
were prepared through undergraduate programs in Education that gave teacher certifications
upon completion of the program. Most teachers were taught in the state that they planned on
teaching in, this allowed for preparation of teachers on specific education standards. Programs,
such as Teach for America, have brought many non-traditional teachers into the teaching
profession in response to the teacher shortage. Another recently developed type of teacher prep is
labeled lateral or alternative entry, which enables to concurrently complete requirements for their
teaching certification while teaching in schools. Finally, states have opened their schools to
teachers who are licensed and educated in other states. These new teacher certification programs,
along with the desperate need for more effective teachers, has brought these lateral/alternative
entry programs into greater prevalence among states. States with a greater need for teachers will
draw more teachers in from alternative entry pathways as well as other states and states with a
surplus of teachers will send their newly graduated teachers out to other states where getting a
job is nearly assured because of the teacher drought. Along with uneven teacher supply, there is
also the extreme variance in teacher pensions across states and age groups. Teaching is not a
highly paid profession, so the allure for many to become a teacher is the pension program.
Teacher’s pensions cover a percentage of their final salary for the rest of their lives, their
Defined Benefit programs give teachers access to better retirement options and an option for
retirement at a reasonably young age. This paper will analyze the effect of the pension generosity
of an out-of-state teacher’s state of origin on their likelihood leave the North Carolina public
school system.

Daniella Henry

5

Reciprocal teacher certification licensing agreements through national accreditation and
certification associations, the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education or
National Association of State Directors of Teacher Education and Certification, allow for greater
interstate mobility of the teacher’s labor market. The teacher labor market until recently had
created a reasonably significant barrier for individuals to move between states, which caused a
surplus in some states and a shortage in others. Although opening up the markets to allow for
mobility has begun to reduce the teacher shortage in some areas, the new mobility of teachers
has also brought to the forefront research on how out-of-state teachers function in their adopted
state’s schools.8 In studies on teacher effectiveness, it was found that out-of-state teachers are
less effective than both alternative entry and in-state teachers (Bastian & Henry, 2015).
Furthermore, it was found that out-of-state teachers are also more likely to leave the labor force
in their first three years, and the most likely to turnover within their first year of teaching
compared to all other types of teachers (Redding & Henry, 2018).
Teacher Distribution by State of Origin
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North Carolina is one of many states that face teacher shortages such that 25% of their
teaching positions are filled by out-of-state and alternate-entry individuals (Baskin & Henry,
2015). There has been new research on the impacts of out-of-state teachers on effectiveness and
turnover, but a lack of research into reasons why out-of-state teachers tend to turnover more
frequently than their in-state counterparts. Studies have found that teachers who turnover often
return to their states of origin and teach when they return (Boyd et Al., 2005). With this
knowledge, we can address the following questions:
•

Which states-of-origin see the largest number of turnovers?

•

Using a measure for the generosity of pensions on a state by state basis, do states with
more generous benefits draw more teachers away from the state where they begin
teaching?

Teacher quality and turnover has a major effect on student achievement, both teachers who
leave their schools mid-year see negative effects on not only the achievement of the students in
that classroom but on the students in classrooms across the school (Redding & Henry, 2018).
The pension effects of teachers are particularly important because of the lasting effects of
education on the earnings of students. It is critical that the effects of state pension programs on
teacher turnover be examined in greater detail to begin to offer better policy proposals to reform
the teacher pension program (Backes et al., 2016).

Background
Teacher pension programs are unique: they are one of the last havens for defined benefits
plans, which are generally more generous than defined contribution plans. A defined benefit plan
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gives a yearly allowance to a teacher that is defined when they sign their contract. For most
teacher pension plans the equation for their benefit is
B=M*YOS*FAS
In the above equation, B represents the total annual benefit, M is the pension multiplier, YOS
annotates the years of service, and the FAS is the final average salary. Depending on the state
there may also be cost of living adjustments and the plan may be adjusted for inflation.
Within the pension program, there are also vesting years, as more teachers retire, the
required vesting period for most states has risen. Vesting periods are the amount of time that a
teacher must work before they become eligible to collect pension once they reach the
requirements for retirement or early retirement. It takes between 3-10 years for a teacher to
become vested; North Carolina has a four-year vesting period, which is short in comparison to
most states. Vesting periods do not transfer between states, which incentivizes most teachers to
remain in the original state they began teaching in, or to transfer early in their career because the
amount of money paid towards pension during the vesting period remains with the departing
state’s retirement system. The retirement age for teachers varies between states and is generally
anywhere between 58-67 depending on years of service. There are plans that offer early
retirement in almost every state – excluding Alabama, District of Columbia and, Massachusetts –
which gives the teacher the option to retire at an earlier age or lesser amount of service in
exchange for a smaller multiplier. Many plans depend on a mix of work and service years to
define when a teacher can receive full benefits without a penalty in their multiplier with rules
that define the age and years of service necessary for full benefits or with rules such the rule-of90 in Virginia, Vermont, and Idaho. Other states have similar plans.
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The other style of pension plan that is more popular in the private sector is the Defined
Contribution plan. Defined Contribution plans link a teacher’s benefits directly to their
contributions and the contributions of their employer. Some states have begun to offer hybrid
Defined Contribution/Defined Benefit plans, but most states remain on strictly Defined Benefit
plans.
This paper assumes that a utility maximization theory can be applied to the turnover
decision of teachers. This says that teachers will make a rational decision to leave their current
position teaching in North Carolina if the decision will lead to greater compensation, including
retirement benefits, or long-term utility to the individual. This decision should depend on a
weighing of salary, pension benefits, non-monetary benefits (such as health care), and
geographical location, that affect the cost of living.

Prior Research on Teacher Pensions and Turnover
In the past several years there has been an increasing amount of research comparing the
different qualities of different teacher entry pathways, on the effectiveness of the teachers, their
perceived preparedness and their attrition rate. A few articles have examined the impact of outof-state teachers on their students, but these articles have generally failed to examine the reasons
behind the unique effects of out-of-state teachers. Although pension plans vary dramatically
between states, they have yet to be a topic of systematic examination but the findings from
earlier papers should be able to inform some potential effects of pensions on out-of-state
teachers.
First, teachers who are from out-of-state are generally less effective and more likely to
turn over within their first five years. Out-of-state teachers feel less prepared than their in-state
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counterparts (Hammond, Chung & Frelow, 2002). Certified teachers generally feel a greater
sense of obligation to their students. It is unknown how the effects of attending school in the
state where one teaches may affect a sense of preparedness, teachers with more experience being
a classroom aid in the state of their program generally felt better prepared to (Hammond, Chung
& Frelow, 2002). Not only do out-of-state teachers generally feel less prepared, but they are also
less effective than both in-state teachers and alternative entry pathways, that do not receive a
certification to teach by their first year (Bastian & Henry, 2015). The first three years of teaching
show the greatest jumps in teacher effectiveness, but even after five years, out-of-state teachers
are less effective than either of their counterparts (Bastian & Henry, 2015, Henry, Bastian &
Fortner, 2011). Teachers who score poorly on their evaluations, or are ineffective are also more
likely to leave in the middle of the year, much like teachers who feel less of a connection to their
students (Redding & Henry, 2018, Hammond, Chung & Frelow, 2002). Within year attrition is a
serious issue in schools specifically because it leaves students without a teacher, generally
requiring either a short- or long-term substitute teacher which forces students to adapt to new
teaching styles and practices as well as brings a teacher from outside the school into a new
environment where they have little to no prior relationships with students or teachers. When a
teacher leaves mid-year, students generally see a 7.5% standard deviation lower testing score
than students whose teacher remains the entire year (Henry & Redding, 2018). Even when
teachers leave at the end of the year, the year leading up to their exit the school generally sees a
significant decrease in their effectiveness (Redding & Henry, 2018, Henry, Bastian & Fortner,
2011). Although many of these studies have focused on the different effects of in-state and inschool impacts on teacher turnover, they have focused on the push factors, not what might pull
the out-of-state teacher to return to their state of origin. This study will focus on the different
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features of pension plans that might incentivize a teacher to leave North Carolina in favor of
returning to their state of origin.
Teacher attrition tends to affect low-income schools the most because they have much
higher rates of new teachers, who are more likely to turnover than their more experienced
coworkers. Nevertheless, new teachers make up approximately 25% of the teacher workforce
making studies into what causes them to leave critically important to finding solutions to the
teacher shortage (Redding & Henry, 2018, Ingersoll & Merrill, 2010, Bastian & Henry, 2015).
One of the biggest financial rewards for teachers is their pension program. Although there is
some debate about how much a teacher values their pension plan when choosing a position, it
does give teachers access to a relatively generous retirement fund (Backs et al., 2016, Podgursky
et al., 2018. The pension plans vary from state to state, from what types of pension plans are
offered to the vesting period and the transfer options. Teacher benefits have been dropping for
newer teachers, who face longer vesting periods and fewer benefits (Podgursky et al., 2018).
Pension plans are increasingly underfunded either due to underfunding by the State or
overestimating returns from investments (Backs et al., 2016). Funding the plans relies on
incoming teachers, half of new teachers will not remain long enough to receive benefits from
their pension plans –vesting plans tend to take 1 to 10 years- and even those who remain long
enough have most of their pay into their pension program go to older teacher’s due to low assetto-liability ratios (Backs et al., 2016, Podgursky et al., 2018).
Teacher pensions offer a unique ability to predict pension benefits. The researcher has an
insight into both the final salary and the years of service that a teacher is likely to complete.
While this amount of data is hard to find in other professions, teacher pension benefits can be
predicted with a fair amount of accuracy (Ni & Podgursky, 2016). In a study on the effects of
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teacher pension changes on teacher turnover, Shawn Ni and Michael Podgursky found that
teachers will be less likely to turnover if the pension programs change from a Defined Benefit
policy to a Defined Contribution policy. Defined Benefit policies tend to incentivize teachers to
drop out after they reach retirement age, the money that they make by continuing to work is
worth less than the money they would receive from the pension program (Backes et al., 2016).
The defined benefit system means that after retirement age a teacher who continues teaching will
be paying more into the retirement system than they would receive if they just received their
pension payments. This means that teachers with greater experience are incentivized to retire or
lose resources, only a few teachers choose to continue after retirement age. Defined Contribution
plans tend to favor a smoother benefit accrual, it also allows teachers to have greater control over
their own pension program. Although Ni and Podgursky offer one of the few studies specifically
focusing on the effect of pension plans on teacher turnover they focus their study on only one
state’s pension program and ignore the effects of mobility of the teacher workforce on turnover.
As the mobility of the teacher workforce grows, the impacts of various pension benefits, such as
the generosity of pensions, the vesting periods, and the access to early retirement, need to be
tested as well to judge the impact of specific pension offerings on teacher attrition. With out-ofstate teachers having access to greater mobility between states, their response to different
pension effects should offer a look into the effectiveness of the incentives that programs have to
offer.

Data and Sample
The data set for this study uses out-of-state North Carolina Public School (NCPS)
teachers over their first five years of teaching. If the teacher continues teaching at their school,
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moves to a different North Carolina school, or leaves North Carolina teaching altogether they are
separated into different categories. A total of 30,730 teachers from NCPS are included in this
study who are in their first five years of teaching from 2012 to 2016 and are not from North
Carolina. About 20% of all NCPS teachers left teaching and only 0.76% of all of these teachers
attended school in North Carolina, none have a North Carolina teaching license. Although the
study does not include the home-state of each teacher, this study uses the state the teacher
received their bachelor’s degree is being used as a proxy for the state-of-origin because the state
code was reported for 30,499 of these teachers. This assumes that most teachers attend an
undergraduate program in their home state. In their first five years of teaching, teachers have
been found more likely to leave teaching, so only teachers in their first five years were included.
The pension measurement uses a multiplier, the final salary, and the years of service
(YOS) to create a scale for the pension benefits potentially received by each teacher if they
returned to their home state. To connect each teacher to their potential benefit, each teacher is
matched with their home state, the home state’s pension multiplier, and their age is used to
calculate the number of years they would work before being eligible for pension benefits, then
using these parameters assigning each teacher a potential value for their pension benefits. Along
with the generosity measurement for each state, other pension information is included in the
regression analysis. This includes the contribution rate of the employee, the length of the vesting
period, and the potential for early retirement. Some states had multiple values for the multiplier
or the contribution rate, in these cases the highest possible multiplier value and the lowest
contribution rate was used. These were used to simulate the best possible benefits that could be
awarded to a retiring teacher if they return to their home state. This assumption is based on both
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the idea that the individual will attempt to maximize their benefit and to allow the teacher to see
the greatest possible impact of pension benefits.
Each teacher is matched with a pension value that would maximize their own personal
benefit. For each pension program, there is a steep drop in dollar gain once an individual reaches
retirement age, this means that to calculate the maximum benefit awarded to each teacher their
earliest possible retirement date must be calculated. Each state has a variety of guidelines that
dictate the earliest possible retirement age and years of service, using these guidelines, age
brackets were assigned to each teacher to calculate the years of service (YOS) each teacher
would serve until they were eligible to retire with full benefits, maximizing their personal benefit
from the pension program, see appendix (Table 2). The calculation of YOS by age is then used to
calculate the pension benefit each teacher would receive. The calculated benefits then are used in
the regression to test if the generosity of the pension plan affects the likelihood that the teacher
leaves NCPS.
If teachers are using a long-term, utility maximizing decision-making process they are
likely to return to their state-of-origin if that state has a more generous pension. More recent
economic theory has suggested that the value of long-term benefits is viewed as discounted,
worth less, because of the long-term payoff. If truly rational decision making is playing into the
turnover decision-making process, teachers will return to their state-of-origin if their pension
generosity is higher and the employee contribution rate is lower than North Carolina’s. The
vesting period is unlikely to cause a significant effect on the likelihood to turnover due to the fact
that young teachers, like most teacher in their first 5 years, will have to work significantly longer
than the vesting years to reach retirement age or years of service.
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Modeling
This paper uses logistical regression modeling to test the difference between the value of
pension benefits and the likelihood to turnover. For this paper, the likelihood that a teacher turns
over is treated as equally likely during the first five years, and the pension value is calculated for
each teacher each year based on their age at the end of the year. For the purposes of this paper
the educator has two options at the end of the year, leave NCPS or continue teaching, the
assumed value of leaving teaching in North Carolina is captured by the potential pension values,
and the value in staying in the pension they would receive as a North Carolina teacher.
Equation 1 is a reduced form of the equation for the estimation of pension benefit effect.
𝑌𝑖𝑠 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽2 𝑉𝑠 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑠 + 𝛽4 𝑇𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝑖𝑠 + 𝑒𝑖𝑠
where
𝑌𝑖𝑠 is the variable for leaving NCPS teaching, coded 1 for leaving and 0 for staying, for teacher i
in state s
𝐵𝑖𝑠 is the awarded potential pension benefit if the teacher left North Carolina teaching in favor of
returning to their home state to teach for teacher i in state s
𝑉𝑠 is the amount of time necessary for teacher i in state s to become vested in the pension
program
𝐶𝑖𝑠 is the required contribution amount from the salary required from teacher i in state s
𝑇𝑖𝑠 is a vector that represents the individual characteristics for teacher i in state s
𝑆𝑖𝑠 are the school characteristics for teacher i in state s
𝑒𝑖𝑠 is the error term specific to teacher i in state s
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Teacher Covariates

School Covariates

Only Out-of-State Licensure

Urbanicity

Advanced Teacher Education

School Performance Composite

Years of Teaching Experience

Title One School Indicator

Age

School FRPM Rate

EVAAS Mean Score

School Minority Rate

NCEES Mean Score

Short Term Suspension Rate

Gender
Ethnicity
Race

School Violent Acts Rate
Per Pupil Expenditure
School Novice Teacher Rate

The covariates include the individual and school characteristics that influence the
likelihood of a teacher turning over. The individual data controls both for differences in
educational and personal experiences as well as for the experiences in the classroom, as captured
by their Education Value-Added Assessment Score (EVAAS) and North Carolina Educator
Effectiveness System(NCEES) scores. The school variables capture common school stressors
such as urbanicity of their school, the monetary resources available to the school and the student
characteristics for each school.
For teacher covariates, out-of-state licensure only as well as their education ratio both
relate to their labor mobility. The out-of-state licensure is a descriptive variable for teachers who
may have been educated in North Carolina but received their teacher licensure outside of the
state. Teachers with out-of-state licensure have the ability to return to the state that they have
licensure and having higher degrees, whether inside or outside the education track, would allow
for greater mobility. Teacher EVAAS and NCEES scores are related to teacher effectiveness,
these can affect both if teachers feel successful in their job or potentially are fired by their school
for low effectiveness (Redding & Henry, 2018, Darling-Hammond, Chung & Frelow, 2002).
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Schools characteristics such as the ones listed in the table above are related to the conditions that
teachers work in. In schools with low student expenditures and high expulsion rates teachers
generally find it harder to work at and try to leave these schools for schools with more support
for both students and teachers, or leave the profession all together (Boyd et al., 2005, DonitsaSchmidt& Zuzovsky, 2016, Lindqvist, Nordänger & Carlsson, 2014).

Findings
The purpose of this study was the determine the effects of pension generosity on the
likelihood that a teacher leaves the NCPS system. In reporting the results, the statistical
significance (𝛼 < 0.05) was used to judge the relevant finding in comparison to other variables
run while testing (Table 3). The main findings are listed below:
1. The generosity of the potential pension along with the vesting and contribution rates were
not found to be statistically significant.

Pension Benefits
The pension variable did not have a statistically significant effect on the turnover
likelihood at the α<0.05 but had a P-Value of 0.058 making it very close. This coefficient shows
that higher pension benefits in the state-of-origin might actually reduce teacher turnover slightly.
This could be because the pension benefit calculations do not take into consideration the cost of
living in each district that they return to, meaning some pensions may seem higher in dollarvalue but are lower when measured in real terms. This also might be because the pension system
is very unclear for both teachers in the system and those who are thinking about moving states.
There could also be a greater competition for jobs in states with more generous pensions, making
it difficult for teachers to return to their states-of-origin. Finally, there could be a negative
relationship simply because pension payouts are not highly valued by teachers when changing
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states. The importance that teachers place on pension benefits is hotly contested in education
literature, although it is a unique and generous benefit offered to teachers, the long-term payoff is
often not at the forefront of teachers’ calculations about new jobs (Ni & Podgursky, 2016).

Vesting
The vesting period was not found to have a statistically significant effect (p=0.273),
which is likely an effect of the age of the teachers. Teachers at the end of their fourth year would
be vested in the North Carolina system, but not in most states. For young teachers, the effect of a
vesting period would be minimal because it is the number of years that they would work to
become eligible for full benefits.

Contribution
Contribution rates have the most impact on day-to-day activities of teachers because they
come directly from the teacher’s paycheck, even with little concern for the future payout of the
pension benefits, the contribution rate was expected to have a negative effect on the likelihood
that a teacher turns over.

Conclusion
Policy discussions over teacher turnover have focused on the school and individual
characteristics that may lead one to be more likely to turn over but excludes a systematic
investigation of interstate push and pull factors for the most part. This paper sought to test the
importance of one interstate factor, pension benefits, on interstate movement in an attempt to
discern what pension options tend to pull teachers away from ‘training ground’ states like North
Carolina and back towards their home states. This paper discovered that pension generosity,
vesting periods and employee contribution rates do not have statistically significant effects. This
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has many possible implications for future pension policy discussions. Most significantly, it
shows that just increasing the generosity of pensions will not necessarily bring more teachers to
states in need, nor keep teachers in North Carolina. The lack of substantial effect of pension
options suggests the potential that the pension information available to teachers is lacking in a
way that would not allow them to make well-educated choices, which would undermine the basic
economic assumptions of utility maximization, explaining why more potential pension benefits
would not correlate to more teacher turnover.
It also suggests that there are other driving factors for teachers to leave North Carolina
teaching, many of these have been studied and supported such as the resources both in
mentorship and monetary resources, there are also personal traits that make one more likely to
turn over, such as degrees in subjects other than teacher education or being prepared in programs
other than traditional in-state teaching programs. There is also likely to be a personal effect, a
desire to return to the home-state where friends and family may be located. Finally, there is the
effect of teaching for a couple of years in a state that has a teaching shortage, where finding a job
is easier, and returning to the home-state with a few years of experience to apply to job openings.
This last effect causes a cyclical issue for both the home-state and the shortage state.
There needs to be a simplification of the pension program for teachers to be able to make
informed pension decisions. With a complicated pension system, states also lose the ability to
use the pension program to offer more generous plans as a recruitment benefit. The current years
of service and age requirements are complicated and often redundant which makes planning for
the future almost impossible, as well as often might lead teachers to work past their earliest
retirement date, which benefits the pension system and the state's deficit but reduces the benefits
to teachers who are still working. Each state should better simplify their Defined Benefit plan or
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only receive the amount placed in the pension account by themselves and their employer alone
with interest, making the benefit amount clear to both the employer and the employee.
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Appendix
Table 1:

Left NC Teaching
State of BA
Generosity of Benefits
Vesting
Contribution Rate
Only Out-of-State Licensure
Teacher Education
Years of Teaching
Experience
Age
EVAAS Mean Score
NCEES Mean Score
Urbanicity
School Performance
Composite
Title One
School FRPM Rate
School Minority Rate
Short Term Suspension Rate
School Violent Acts Rate
Per Pupil Expenditure
School Novice Teacher Rate
Gender
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other Ethnicity/Race

Observations
30,730
30,499
30,435
30,445
30,445
30,730
30,730
30,730

Mean
0.2018549
33.63799
36245.7
8.062572
0.0681077
0.0076147
4.385877
2.250602

Min
0
1
2813.22
3
0.01
0
4
0

Max
1
56
75001.88
10
0.03
1
7
5

30,730
17,364
26,544
30,730
30,485

31.47322
-0.044949
3.401842
2.283697
57.23292

1
-14.80687
1
1
6

78
16.32
5
4
100

30,730
30,701
30,730
30,730
30,717
30,730
30,730
30,734
30,734
30,734
30,734
30,734

0.4889684
56.65837
55.58452
16.25314
6.68439
82.12358
0.2639156
0.7946899
0.0607145
0.0212468
0.009566
0.0137633

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
100
100
371
190
422.0884
1
1
1
1
1
1
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Alabama

State
Code
AL

Alaska
Arkansas

AK
AR

American Samoa

AS

Arizona

AZ

California

CA

Colorado

CO

Connecticut

CT

District of
Columbia

DC

Delaware

DE

Florida

FL

Georgia

GA

Guam
Hawaii

GU
HI

Iowa

IA

Equations
YOS=10 if age ≥ 52
YOS=10+(52-age) if age < 52
-YOS=5 if age ≥ 55
YOS=5+(55-age) if 32 < age < 55
YOS=28 if age ≤ 32
-YOS=1 if age ≥ 64
YOS=1+(64-age) if 55 < age ≤ 64
YOS=10 if 52 < age ≤ 55
YOS=10+(52-age) if 37 < age ≤ 52
YOS=25 if 35 < age ≤ 37
YOS=25+(35-age) if 30 < age ≤ 35
YOS=30 if age ≤ 30
YOS=5 if age ≥ 62
YOS=5+(62-age) if age < 62
YOS=35 if age ≤ 53
YOS=(88-age) if age > 53
YOS=5 if age ≥ 40
YOS=20+(40-age) if 25 < age < 40
YOS=35 if age ≤ 25
YOS=5 if age ≥ 57
YOS=5+(57-age) if 40 ≤ age < 57
YOS=20+(40-age) if 30 ≤ age < 40
YOS=30 if age < 30
YOS=10 if age ≥ 55
YOS=10+(55-age) if 45 < age ≤ 55
YOS=20 if 40 < age ≤ 45
YOS=20+(40-age) if 30 < age ≤ 40
YOS=30 if age ≤ 30
YOS=8 if age ≥ 57
YOS=8+(57-age) if age < 57
YOS=10 if age ≥ 45
YOS=10+(45-age) if 25 ≤ age < 45
YOS=30 if age < 25
-YOS=10 if age ≥ 55
YOS=10+(55-age) if 35 ≤ age < 55
YOS=30 if age < 35
YOS=7 if age ≥ 58
YOS=7+(58-age) if 40 < age < 58
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Idaho

ID

Illinois

IL

Indiana

IN

Kansas

KS

Kentucky

KY

Louisiana

LA

Massachusetts

MA

Maryland

MD

Maine

ME

Michigan

MI

Minnesota

MN

Missouri

MO

Northern Marianas
Mississippi

MP
MS

Montana

MT

North Carolina

NC

YOS=25+((40-age)/2) if age ≤ 40
YOS=5 if age ≥ 60
YOS=5+(60-age) if 40 < age < 60
YOS=25+((40-age)/2) if age ≤ 40
YOS=10 if age ≥ 57
YOS=10+(57-age) if age < 57
YOS=10 if age ≥ 55
YOS=10+(55-age) if 30 ≤ age < 55
YOS=29+((30-age)/2) if age < 30
YOS=5 if age ≥ 60
YOS=5+(60-age) if 35 ≤ age < 60
YOS=30 if 30 ≤ age < 35
YOS=30+(30-age) if age < 30
YOS=5 if age ≥ 55
YOS=5+(55-age) if 33 ≤ age < 55
YOS=27 if age < 33
YOS=5 if age ≥ 55
YOS=5+(55-age) if age < 55
YOS=10 if age ≥ 50
YOS=10+(50-age) if age < 50
YOS=10 if age ≥ 55
YOS=10+(55-age) if 40 ≤ age < 55
YOS=25+((40-age)/2) if age < 40
YOS=1 if age ≥ 64
YOS=1+(64-age) if age < 64
YOS=10 if age ≥ 50
YOS=10+(50-age) if age < 50
YOS=3 if age ≥ 63
YOS=3+(63-age) if age < 63
YOS=5 if age ≥ 55
YOS=5+(55-age) if 40 ≤ age < 55
YOS=20+((40-age)/2) if 20 ≤ age < 40
YOS=30 if age < 20
-YOS=8 if age ≥ 57
YOS=8+(57-age) if 35 ≤ age < 57
YOS=30 if age < 35
YOS=5 if age ≥ 55
YOS=5+(55-age) if 35 ≤ age < 55
YOS=25 if age < 35
YOS=10 if age ≥ 55
YOS=10+(55-age) if 40 < age ≤ 55
YOS=25 if 35 < age ≤ 40
YOS=25+(35-age) if 30 < age ≤ 35
YOS=30 if age ≤ 30
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North Dakota

ND

Nebraska

NE

New Hampshire

NH

New Jersey

NJ

New Mexico

NM

Nevada

NV

New York

NY

Ohio

OH

Oklahoma

OK

Oregon

OR

Pennsylvania

PA

Puerto Rico
Rhode Island

PR
RI

South Carolina

SC

YOS=5 if age ≥ 60
YOS=5+(60-age) if 40 < age ≤ 60
YOS=25+((40-age)/2) if 30 < age ≤ 40
YOS=30+(30-age) if age ≤ 30
YOS=1 if age ≥ 64
YOS=1+(64-age) if 45 < age ≤ 64
YOS=20+((45-age)/2) if 25 < age ≤ 45
YOS=30+(25-age) if age ≤ 25
YOS=1 if age ≥ 64
YOS=1+(64-age) if age < 64
YOS=10 if age ≥ 55
YOS=10+(55-age) if age < 55
YOS=5 if age ≥ 62
YOS=5+(62-age) if 55 < age ≤ 62
YOS=12+((55-age)/2) if 37 < age ≤ 55
YOS=30 if 25 < age ≤ 37
YOS=30+(25-age) if age ≤ 25
YOS=5 if age ≥ 60
YOS=5+(60-age) if 55 < age ≤ 60
YOS=10 if 52 < age ≤ 55
YOS=10+(52-age) if 32 < age ≤ 52
YOS=30 if age ≤ 32
YOS=10 if age ≥ 55
YOS=10+(55-age) if 40 < age ≤ 55
YOS=25 if 35 < age ≤ 40
YOS=25+(35-age) if 30 < age ≤ 35
YOS=30 if age ≤ 30
YOS=5 if age ≥ 60
YOS=5+(60-age) if 30 < age ≤ 60
YOS=35 if 25 < age ≤ 30
YOS=35+(25-age) if age ≤ 25
YOS=5 if age ≥ 60
YOS=5+(60-age) if age < 60
YOS=5 if age ≥ 60
YOS=5+(60-age) if 35 < age ≤ 60
YOS=35 if 28 < age ≤ 35
YOS=35+(25-age) if age ≤ 28
YOS=3 if age ≥ 62
YOS=3+(62-age) if 30 ≤ age < 62
YOS=35+((30-age)/2) if age < 30
-YOS=5 if age ≥ 57
YOS=5+(57-age) if age < 57
YOS=8 if age ≥ 57
YOS=8+(57-age) if 40 ≤ age < 57
YOS=25+((40-age)/2) if age < 40
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South Dakota

SD

Tennessee

TN

Texas

TX

Utah

UT

Virginia

VA

Virgin Islands
Vermont

VI
VT

Washington

WA

Wisconsin

WI

West Virginia

WV

Wyoming

WY

YOS=3 if age ≥ 62
YOS=3+(62-age) if 40 < age ≤ 62
YOS=25+((40-age)/2) if 25 < age ≤ 40
YOS=35+(25-age) if age ≤ 25
YOS=5 if age ≥ 55
YOS=5+(55-age) if 30 ≤ age < 55
YOS=30 if age < 30
YOS=5 if age ≥ 60
YOS=5+(60-age) if 50 < age ≤ 60
YOS=15+((40-age)/2) if 40 < age ≤ 50
YOS=20+(40-age) if age ≤ 40
YOS=4 if age ≥ 61
YOS=4+(61-age) if 30 ≤ age < 61
YOS=35 if age < 30
YOS=5 if age ≥ 57
YOS=5+(57-age) if 34 ≤ age < 57
YOS=28+((34-age)/2) if age < 34
-YOS=5 if age ≥ 60
YOS=5+(60-age) if 40 ≤ age < 60
YOS=25+((40-age)/2) if age < 40
YOS=5 if age ≥ 60
YOS=10 if 55 < age ≤ 60
YOS=11+(55-age) if 44 < age ≤ 55
YOS=10+(44-age) if age ≤ 44
YOS=5 if age ≥ 60
YOS=5+(60-age) if 35 < age ≤ 60
YOS=30 if 27 < age ≤ 35
YOS=30+(57-age) if age ≤ 27
YOS=5 if age ≥ 55
YOS=5+(55-age) if 30 < age ≤ 55
YOS=30 if 25 < age ≤ 30
YOS=30+(25-age) if 20 < age ≤ 25
YOS=35 if age ≤ 20
YOS=4 if age ≥ 61
YOS=4+(61-age) if 45 ≤ age < 61
YOS=20+((45-age)/2) if age < 45

Table 3:
Odds Ratio

P-Value

Generosity of Benefits

0.9999953

0.058

Vesting

0.987441

0.299

Contribution Rate

3.084215

0.136
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Only Out-of-State Licensure

0.1851565

0.000

Teacher Education Ratio

1.004595

0.923

Years of Teaching Experience

1.045473

0.003

Age

0.9784618

0.000

EVAAS Mean Score

0.9771979

0.013

NCEES Mean Score

0.7765498

0.000

Urbanicity

1.070399

0.000

School Performance Composite

0.9953837

0.014

Title One

1.144056

0.033

School FRPM Rate

0.9970282

0.077

School Minority Rate

1.003689

0.015

Short Term Suspension Rate

1.001428

0.288

School Violent Acts Rate

1.000349

0.918

Per Pupil Expenditure

0.993241

0.657

School Novice Teacher Rate

1.660527

0.016

Gender

1.081452

0.175

Black

0.8779327

0.197

Hispanic

1.127893

0.486

Asian

1.294369

0.297

Other Ethnicity/Race

1.322661

0.436
n=16,075
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